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TAX TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS TO
THE WIDOWS OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
FRANK J. PELISEK*
The tax consequences of payments by a corporation to the widow
of a deceased officer or employee is a problem of concern to every
practitioner who represents corporate clients. This is especially true
of those representing small closely knit corporations where this prob-
lem most often arises. Initially involved is the narrow distinction be-
tween the broad definition of income' and the limited exclusion pro-
vided for gifts.2 A further complication has been created by the varied
interpretation of the exclusion provisions of Sec. 101(b).3 Tax prac-
titioners initially believed that Sec. 101(b) had put to rest the Com-
missioner-widow controversy and had made the 1939 Code cases on
the subject obsolete. Subsequent events have shown the error of this
initial reaction. For that reason the following includes a review of
the authority on this subject under the 1939 Code as well as the cur-
rent code.4
*Associate Michael, Spohn, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee; L.L.B. Wis-
consin, 1958.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
"SEC. 61. GROSS INCOME DEFINED.
(a) General Definition.-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but
not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and
similar items;
(7) Dividends;
(ii) Pensions;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; ... "
2 Int. Rev. Code 1954.
"SEC. 102. GIFTS AND INHERITANCES.
(a) General Rule.-Gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
"SEC. 101. CERTAIN DEATH BENEFITS.
.(65 Employees' Death Benefits.-
(1) General Rule.-Gross income does not include amounts received
(whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate
of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer
and are paid by reason of the death of the employee.
(2) Special Rules for Paragraph (1).-
(A) $5,000 Limitation.-The aggregate amounts excludable under
paragraph (1) with respect to the death of any employee shall not
exceed $5,000."
4 The entire subject of gifts is presently under close scrutiny by the courts. At
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TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS IN THE HANDS OF
THE WIDOW UNDER THE 1939 CODE
Although the Internal Revenue Service has within the past several
years closely scrutinized voluntary payments to widows of corporate
officers, its earlier pronouncements on the issue were directly con-
trary. In 1914 the Treasury Department determined, under the pro-
visions of the Revenue Act of 1913, that
When the monthly salary of an officer or employee is paid
for a limited period after his death to his widow in recognition
of the services rendered by her husband, no services being
rendered by the widow, it is held that such payment is a gratu-
ity and exempt from taxation under the income tax laws. 5
This initial position was reaffirmed in 19216 and again in 1939.7 Under
the broad protection of the 1939 ruling, many employers began to
voluntarily pay allowances to widows of deceased officers and em-
ployees in recognition of past services. This rash of activity in the
area after the Commissioner's announcement in I.T. 3329 was due to
the emphasis of the Treasury on the question of whether the re-
cipient had rendered any service to the paying organization. Prior to
this announcement the emphasis had, since 1920, been on the ques-
tion of whether services had been rendered to the payor.8 It is obvi-
least three cases involving taxation of alleged gifts were before the United
States Supreme Court during the October, 1959 term. See Kaiser v. United
States, 262 F. 2d 367 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. granted 359 U.S. 1010 (1959),
aff'd.-U.S.-, 80 S.Ct. 1204 (1960) ; Duberstein v. Comm., 265 F. 2d 28 (6th
Cir. 1959, cert. granted 361 U.S. 923 (1959), aff'd.-U.S.-, 80 S.Ct. 1190(1960); and Stanton v. United States, 268 F. 2d 727 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert.
granted, 4 L. Ed. 239 (1959), remanded-U.S.-, 80 S.Ct. 1192 (1960). Involved
in these cases were the tax status of union strike benefits (held to be gifts),
items given to non-employee who furnished leads to customers (held to be
income), and voluntary payments to retiring manager of church real estate
(remanded for further proceedings). During the argument of these cases
the Government proposed a standard test that would apply to all future gift
cases in the following terms: "Gifts should be defined as transfers of property
made for personal as distinguished from business reasons." The Court refused
to adopt this broad test. Instead it declared that each gift case must be de-
cided on its own facts with the controlling question one of intent. "We take
it that the proper criterion, established by decision here, is one that inquires
what the basic reason for his (the donor's) conduct was in fact-the dominant
reason that explains his (the donor's) action in making the transfer. Further
than that we do not think it profitable to go."
T.D. 2090; 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259 (unpublished).
6 O.D. 1017: 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921). ".... a corporation paid to the widow of
a deceased officer a certain amount equal to the salary he would have earned
in two months. The payment was without consideration, a gratuity voted as a
compliment to the deceased. It is held that the payment does not constitute
taxable income."
7 I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153. "When an allowance is paid by an organiza-
tion to which the recipient has rendered no service the amount is deemed to
be a gift or gratuity and is not subject to Federal income tax in the hands
of the recipient."
8 Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 32. ... so-called pension awarded by one to whom no
services had been rendered are mere gifts or gratuities and are not tax-
able...." See also Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-2.
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ous that the test of I.T. 3329 was much easier to satisfy. In almost
all cases the widow of a deceased officer or employee would not have
rendered any service to the paying corporation. However, under the
earlier regulations, it could have been argued that services had been
rendered to the corporation by the deceased husband and that the vol-
untary payments were for those services.
In shifting the emphasis in this area from the benefit to the cor-
poration, to the activity of the recipient, the Treasury undoubtedly had
considered the language of the United States Supreme Court in Bo-
gardus v. Commissioner.9 There the question before the Court was
the tax status of payments made by former stockholders of a corpora-
tion to employees of the corporation through the medium of a new
corporation which had taken over a portion of the old corporation's
property. The Court found that the payments were intended as gifts
by the payors and were to be treated as such for tax purposes. In
conclusion the Court noted:
Some stress is laid on the recital to the effect that the bounty
is bestowed in recognition of past loyal services. But this re-
cital amounts to nothing more than the acknowledgment of an
historic fact as a reason for making the gifts. A gift is none
the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for the past faith-
ful service of the recipient. 10
Such a great number of employers began to rely on the broad
Bogardus and I.T. 3329 test that the Commissioner, in 1950, felt
forced to reverse his position and return to the test of the former
regulations. This was done through I.T. 4027 which declared that
"payments made by an employer to the widow of a deceased officer
or employee, are includible in the gross income of the widow for
Federal income tax purposes."'1 The release claimed that I.T. 3329
contained a fundamental error in the placing of emphasis on the lack
of services by the recipient. It stated:
Thus, the essential factor is whether services were rendered
to the employer, not as indicated in I.T. 3329, supra, whether
services were rendered by the recipient."
Since there had been substantial reliance by employers on the prior
ruling it was necessary for the Commissioner to make I.T. 4027 appli-
cable only to payments received after January 1, 1951.
In addition to the potential loss of revenue resulting in employer's
reliance on I.T. 3329, a further motivation for the Commissioner's
reversal of position may have been the initial Tax Court decision di-
rectly involving the question of voluntary payments to widows.13 In
9302 U.S. 34 (1939).
10 Id. at 44.
11 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
12Id. at 10.
13Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949).
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Aprill, the directors of a corporation voted to continue the salary of
its deceased president by paying such amount to his widow "in recog-
nition of the services rendered by Mr. Aprill to this corporation ......
The Commissioner attempted to tax these payments to the widow on
a two-pronged theory. One, that the payments were merely for the
prior services of the deceased husband (the position of I.T. 4027)
and, two, that the payments were dividends to the widow, who was
a substantial stockholder in the corporation. The Court noted that
under either theory the controlling question would be the purpose
which motivated the corporation in making the payments. The Court
further noted that although the corporate resolution referred to the
payments in terms of recognition for the deceased husband's prior
services and the corporation deducted the payments as salary expense
(which the Commissioner subsequently disallowed), these facts were
satisfactorily explained by the desire of the corporation to comply
with I.T. 3329. The Commissioner's contention of a dividend was
dismissed as totally unsupported by the facts.
Within a year the Commissioner published I.T. 4027. Thus the
battle lines were drawn between the Tax Court directives in Aprill,
and the Commissioner's position in I.T. 4027. The subsequent history
of the controversy clearly indicates that the Commissioner has been
the loser.
Almost five years elapsed between the announcement of I.T. 4027
and the decision in Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom' where the Tax
Court directly met and disregarded the Commissioner's position.
During that period four other cases were decided by the Tax Court
without mention of the 1950 ruling.'5 In each of these interim cases
the Court found the payments to be gifts.' 6 Although I.T. 4027 was
ignored in these cases, it was Hellstrom which dealt the knockout
punch to that directive.'7 There the corporation paid to the widow of
the deceased president of the corporation, the balance of his annual
salary for the year of his death by a resolution indicating the payment
was "in recognition of the services" of the deceased. This amount was
taken as a salary deduction by the corporation. The Commissioner
'1424 T.C. 916 (1955).
15 Alice M. MacFarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952); Ruth Hahn, 13 T.C.M. 308 (1954);
Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 14 T.C.M. 577 (1955), and Marie G. Haskell, 14
T.C.M. 788 (1955).
16 It should be noted that the Commissioner, in order to be consistent with his
announcement in I.T. 4027, acquisced in Aprill and MacFarlane, since the
payments there involved were made prior to January 1, 1951. See 1950-2 Cum.
Bull. 1 and 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 5. The Commissioner has not acquiesced in
any subsequent case despite his recent announcement that he would not litigate
cases in this area involving 1939 Code years unless peculiar facts were in-
volved. See Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914; T.I.R. 87, August 25,
1958.
'1 See also Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) for a sub-
sequent direct rejection of I.T. 4027.
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relied solely on his 1950 announcement in attempting to tax the widow
on the payments. The Court directly overruled I.T. 4027 in stating:
. . . We, however, do not ascribe the far-reaching effect to
that ruling which he does. We understand his ruling to mean
that if the amounts paid to a deceased employee's widow were
not a gift, but were payment for his past services, they con-
stitute ordinary income to the widow. The respondent, obvi-
ously, cannot by administrative ruling tax as ordinary income
a payment which the payor made and intended as a gift. 8
In addition the Court refused to attach any significance to the fact
that the amount of the payments were determined by the deceased's
salary or that the corporation claimed the payments as a salary de-
duction.
From Hellstrom and the prior cases came the controlling facts
necessary to classify the payments as gifts. These briefly stated are:
(1) payment made directly to widow and not to estate of deceased
(2) no obligation on part of corporation to make payments (3) cor-
poration derives no benefit from payments (4) widow performed no
services for corporation and (5) services of deceased previously fully
compensated. These controlling facts have become tests applied in
varying degrees to all of the cases in this area decided subsequent to
Hellstrom.'1 Each of these tests, of course, is merely a tool in arriving
at the question of intent which all of the cases clearly recognize as
controlling. However, the intent of a corporate board of directors is
difficult if not impossible to ascertain without extrinsic aid. It is this
aid which the above noted facts provide.
Cited below are the decisions on this issue decided in favor of the
widow in those of the Tax Court" in proposed deficiency cases and
those of the District Courts2' in refund suits. An examination of these
is Supra note 14 at 919.
19 All of the decided cases recognize that the question of the intent to make a
gift is one of fact. For this reason summary judgment will not normally be
granted for the taxpayer even if all of the tests are met. See Packard v.
United States, 179 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peters v. Smith, 221 F.
2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1956), reversing 123 F. Supp. 711 (E.D.Pa. 1954). But see
Nixon v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19982 (D.C.Tenn. 1957) where
the court ordered a directed verdict for the widow.
20 Tax Court Cases:
Louise K. Aprill, supra note 13; Alice M. MacFarlane, supra note 15; Ruth
Hahn, supra note 15; Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, supra note 15; Marie G.
Haskell, supra note 15; Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, supra note 14;
Elizabeth R. Matthews, 15 T.C.M. 204 (1956); Ethel G. Mann, et al, 16
T.C.M. 212 (1957); Estate of John Hekman, 16 T.C.M. 304 (1957); Estate
of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957) ; Estate of John A. Maycann, 29 T.C.
81 (1957) ; Standard Asbestos Mfg. and Insulating Co., 17 T.C.M. 207 (1958) ;
Estate of Albert W. Morse, 17 T.C.M. 261 (1958) ; Florence E. Carr, 28 T.C.
779 (1957) ; and Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647 (1958).
21 District Court Cases:
Black v. Davis, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19361 (N.D.Ala. 1955); Slater v. Riddell,
56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9892 (S.D.Cal. 1956); Graves v. United States, 56-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 110,034 (N.D. Tex. 1956) ; Rodner v. United States, supra note
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cases reveals significant attitudes taken by the courts in this area which
will be of value in future litigation under the current interpretation of
Sec. 101(b). Initially it should be noted that the amount of the pay-
ment has never troubled the courts in determining the existence or
non-existence of a gift.22 Amounts vary from under five thousand
dollars 23 to over sixty thousand dollars.2 ' The form in which the pay-
ments are made also appears to be of little consequence.2 5 In almost
all of the cases the payments bore some relationship to the salary of
the deceased officer or employee. A payment based solely on salary
would appear at first glance to imply that it was intended as addi-
tional compensation. However it is submitted that the use of the salary
in the making of such payments is merely a measuring device and
should not be determinative or even considered in concluding whether
or not the payments are gifts. Although the amount of payment is
not directly considered, on several instances, the courts have men-
tioned the fact that the widow was in need, as contributing to the
existence of a gift.
28
One of the controlling factors mentioned in Hellstrorn is that the
payments were made directly to the widow and not to the estate of
the deceased. However, even this position has now been relaxed by
the Tax Court. In Estate of Frank J. Foote2 7 the payment involved
17; Jackson v. Granquist, 169 F. Supp. 442 (Ore. 1957); Baur v. United
States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19210 (S.D.Ind. 1956) ; Bledsoe v. United States,
57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19211 (S.D.Ind. 1956); Bankston v. United States, 57-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9626 (W.D. Tenn. 1957) ; Aff'd. 254 F. 2d 641 (6th Cir. 1958) ;
Nixon v. United States, supra note 19; Carley v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
429 (S.D. Ohio 1958); Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States, 164 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.Ky. 1958); Bank of the Southwest National
Ass'n., Houston v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.Tex. 1958); Bounds
v. United States, 262 F. 2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958). reversinq 157 F. Supp. 228
(Md. 1958); Friedlander v. United States, 58-1 U. S. Tax Cas. 9182
(E.D. Wis. 1958); Linoff v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9204
(Minn. 1958); Neuhoff v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9506
(S.D.Fla. 1958); Hardy v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9521 (W.D.Ky.
1958); Jones v. Squier, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9588 (W.D.Wash. 1958); Camp-
bell v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9763 (E.D.Tenn. 1958); Allinger
v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9949 (E.D.Mich. 1958), aff'd. 60-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9312 (6th Cir. 1960); Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp.
205 (W.D.Ky. 1959), aff'd. 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9349 (6th Cir. 1960); and
Greenberg v. United States, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19676 (Neb. 1959).
22 See Graybar Electric Co., 29 T.C. 818 (1958), aff'd. 267 F. 2d 403 (2nd Cir.
1959) where the death benefits were held to be purchase of the stock of the
deceased officer, and Standard Asbestos Mfg. and Insulating Co., supra note
20, where a portion of payments were found to be designed to encourage
widow to hold her stock in the corporation.
23 Ruth Hahn, supra note 15.
24 Alice M. MacFarlane, supra note 15 and Marie G. Haskell, supra note 15.
25 See Rodner v. United States, supra note 17 where payment was in lump sum
and Louise K. Aprill, supra note 13 where twenty-seven monthly payments
were made.
26 Estate of Albert W. Morse, supra note 20; Simpson v. United States, 261 F.
2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958) ; and Baur v. United States, supra note 21.
27 Supra note 20.
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was made to the estate of the deceased and the court still found the
payment to be a gift, noting:
. . . The gift here was made to the estate because it was recog-
nized by the donor corporation that thus it would 'result in
benefit and comfort to all members of his family who were re-
membered by him under his will.' To us this is the same as if
the payment had been made directly to the widow or other
beneficiary. The interposition of the estate is without meaning
otherwise than to ensure that the benefits of the payment would
surely inure to those whom the corporation acting through its
board of directors thought the deceased would want to bene-
fit, ...
28
Despite the decision in Foote, it would appear that safety dictates
that the payment be made directly to the widow if gift status is
sought.29
Also a factor which the courts have declared to be of importance
is that the corporation received no benefit from the payment. Ignored
by the case authority appears to be the intangible benefit received
whenever a payment of this type is made. Certainly the morale of the
other executives is elevated by the prospect that their widows will
also receive payments, or at least that consideration will be given to
such payments upon their death. 30
A consideration mentioned in Hahn3l was that the resolution au-
thorizing payment had not been submitted to the stockholders, but had
merely been adopted by the Board of Directors. The Commissioner
argued that this indicated the payments were additional compensation,
since as a matter of corporate law, only the stockholders may make
gifts while the Board may pass on compensation. The court indicated
that this was a factor which was indicative of the intent of the cor-
poration, but found it to be of "lesser importance." 32 The Commis-
sioner has apparently not advanced this theory in subsequent cases. 33
It could be assumed that the actual language used by the corporate
Board of Directors in authorizing payments to the widow, would be a
valuable aid in ascertaining the exact intention of the Board. The
courts have, however, virtually ignored the wording of the resolution
28 Id. at 550; compare Bausch's Estate, 14 T.C. 1433 (1950), aff'd. 186 F. 2d 313
(2nd Cir. 1951); Brayton v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 537 (Mass. 1941); Estate
of Edgar O'Daniel, 10 T.C. 631 (1948), aff'd. 173 F. 2d 966 (2nd Cir. 1949).
29 Note that in other areas of the 1954 Code, preferential treatment is given for
direct payments as opposed to payments to an estate. See Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §2039(c) and §2042.
30 See for recognition of this benefit, Simpson v. United States, supra note 26.
31 Supra note 15.
32 Id. at 310.
33 See Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A. 2d 295 (1952);
Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 1256 (1953), and Dwyer v. Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289(N.D.Ill. 1954). Involved in each of these cases was the question of director's
liability for payments of gifts to the widow or family of a deceased officer.
In each the court found such payments to be an ultra vires act.
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in resolving the ultimate question of the presence of a gift. In one
recent case 34 the language of the resolution was phrased in terms of
additional compensation. In addition the corporation treated the pay-
ments as salary expense and even deducted withholding taxes on
them. The Court, in spite of this clear manifestation of intent on the
part of the corporation, found the payments to be a gift.35 Normally
the resolutions in the litigated cases followed the language of I.T. 3329
and indicated that the payments were made "in recognition of the
services rendered" by the deceased.3 6 Representative of this type of
resolution is that reported in Helistrom:
RESOLVED, that in recognition of the services rendered
to this corporation for many years by Arthur W. Hellstrom,
its founder and late president, and in conformity with the policy
of this corporation to make reasonable provision for the sur-
viving dependents of its deceased officers and employees, although
it is under no obligation so to do, this Board of Directors does
hereby authorize and direct the Treasurer of this corporation
to pay monthly to Selma M. Hellstrom, the surviving wife of
said Arthur W. Hellstrom, a sum equal to his last salary per
month, said monthly salary to continue until this Board of Di-
rectors shall require the reduction or discontinuance of such
payents. 37
Variations of this type of resolution which state that the payments are
"in consideration of the services rendered" by the deceased have also
won the approval of the courts, 38 as have other like variations.
39
Closely allied to the form of the resolution authorizing payment,
as an indication of intent, is the treatment of the payments upon the
books of the corporation.4 0 Here again the courts have virtually ig-
nored the corporate treatment of the payments. In a number of the
34 Nixon v. United States, supra note 19.
35 Compare Estate of Charles J. Ginsburg, 17 T.C.M. 472 (1958), aff'd. 271 F. 2d
511 (6th Cir. 1959), where the minutes of the directors indicated that the
payments were to be gratuities although the resolution itself mentioned "recog-
nition of services." The court noted the other circumstances surrounding the
payments and found them to be additional compensation.
36 See Ruth Hahn, supra note 15; Estate of Maycann, supra note 20; Jackson
v. Granquist, supra note 21; Marie G. Haskell, supra note 15; Bankston v.
United States, supra note 21; Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, supra note 21; Harriet B. Campbell v. United States, supra note 21;
Estate of Hellstrom, supra note 14, and Louise K. Aprill, supra note 13.
3 Supra note 14 at 918.
38 Slater v. Riddell, supra note 21; Jones v. Squire, supra note 21, and Allinger
v. United States, supra note 21. See also Estate of Hellstrom, supra note
14 at 918 for a destruction of the distinction between "in recognition" and
"in consideration."
39Greenburg v. United States, supra note 21 "grateful recognition of the untiring
efforts and exceptional services"; Carley v. United States, supra note 21
"recognition of efforts and appreciation thereof", and Estate of Albert V.
Morse, supra note 20 "in view of the long years of services."
40 The question of the ability to deduct the payments will be discussed infra.
The discussion here is merely to indicate the effect, on the existence of a gift,
of the treatment given to the payments by the corporation.
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cases decided in favor of the taxpayer, the corporation has deducted
the payments as salary expense." 1 Of special note is Morse,2 where
the corporation originally claimed the payments as general expense.
However, when the corporate return was audited and the expense dis-
allowed, the corporation claimed in its protest that the payments were
salary and that the only question which could be raised by the Com-
missioner was the reasonableness thereof. The court recognized the
conflict of position between the widow and the corporation (in which
the widow was a 50% stockholder), but held that the payments were
intended as gifts. Other corporations, giving some recognition to the
doctrine of intent, have claimed the payments as some other form of
current operating expense.43 Since payments of this type are valid
deductions in most instances, it would seem that the proper method of
deducting payments of this type would be as a general expense under
an account headed "Payments to Widow."'
Rather than rely on the manifestations of intent shown by the
corporate resolution authorizing the payments and the accounting treat-
ment of the payments by the corporation, the courts appear inclined to
rely on the testimony of directors as to what they intended to accom-
plish at the time of the resolution. Several of the cases indicate that
this testimony was received and considered by the court.45 The use
of this type of evidence is shown by the following statement of the
Tax Court in Maycann:
. . .Respondent's argument that the board of directors was
of the opinion that decedent had been receiving a $5,000 bonus
in addition to his stated salary at the time they acted on the
payment to the widow may well be true, but all of the four
directors who were living at the time this case was tried testified
unqualifiedly that they intended by their resolution of Novem-
ber 10, 1950, to make a gift to the widow. One of the directors,
Roy McDonald, who was also a stockholder, also testified that
if the payments voted to Bernice had been intended as a
dividend, he would have insisted on his and his wife's share. 46
Although there appears to be little logic in the courts accepting this
type of evidence, and rejecting totally, or at least giving little con-
41 See Ruth Hahn, supra note 15; Slater v. Riddell, supra note 21; Elizabeth
R. Matthews, supra note 20; Bounds v. United States, supra note 21; Nixon
v. United States, supra note 21; Estate of Albert W. Morse, supra note 20,
and Standard Asbestos lNfg. and Insulating Co., supra note 20.
42 Estate of Albert W. Morse, supra note 20.
43 Carley v. United States, supra note 21; Ethel Mann, supra note 20; Estate
of Maycann, supra note 20; Rodner v. United States, supra note 21; Estate
of Foote, supra note 20; Friedlander v. United States, supra note 21; Jones
v. Squire, supra note 20, and Estate of Hellstrom, supra note 14.
"See Linoff v. United States, supra note 21 and Friedlander v. United States,
supra note 21, for an example of such treatment.
4 Estate of Maycann, supra note 20; Rodner v. United States, supra note 21;
Hardy v. United States, supra note 21, and Estate of Morse, supra note 20.46 Supra note 20 at 86.
[Vol. 44
TAX TREATMENT OF WIDOWS
sideration to, the position taken in the resolution itself and on the
books of the corporation, it must be remembered that the ultimate
question is one of intent. The direct testimony of those who authorized
the payment would seem to be better evidence of this than the
mechanical treatment of the payments or the wording of a resolution.47
In many of the instances where payments to widows of corporate
officers or employees have been made, small closely-held corporations
are involved. Upon the death of the husband, his widow often be-
comes a substantial stockholder. In such instances the Commissioner
has attempted to attack the widow's payments as dividends. Here again
he has met with almost universal defeat. The argument was first made
in Aprill, where it was summarily rejected. This has also been its fate
in most of the subsequent cases.48 The attitude of the Tax Court is
indicated in Marie Haskell, where that body noted the substantial stock
holdings of the widow, but found this fact not to be controlling:
The only circumstance that gives us pause is the fact that
petitioner and her daughter together owned a controlling stock
interest in the Company and respondent has suggested on brief
that the payments were in the nature of a distribution of cor-
porate earnings. We think this suggestion is negatived by the
facts of record. Dividends were paid when warranted by earn-
ings, and in substantial amounts. There is no evidence to show
that mother and daughter took concerted action with respect
to the payments and so far as the record goes, petitioner did
not participate in any of the corporate action pursuant to which
the payments were made.4 9
The Commissioner has, however, not been without some success on
his dividend argument. In Ruth T. Lengsfield, et al,50 the facts revealed
a closely knit family, where the less fortunate individual members had
always received aid from the family as a unit, through a family busi-
ness corporation. The particular payments in dispute were payable
from the surplus of the corporation. The facts also revealed that
payments to widows of deceased family members had often been
made in the past. The court found that the payments were in the na-
ture of a dividend to the recipient and were thus, of course, taxable
to her. The unusual fact situation in Lengsfield distinguishes it from
the average case in this area, and its holding has not given the Com-
47 In other aspects of the gift v. income controversy, the treatment of the pay-
ments by the corporation has also been held not to control. See Stanton v.
United States, supra note 4; Wallace et al v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 855
(5th Cir. 1955); Nickelsburg v. Commissioner, 154 F. 2d 70 (2d Cir. 1946),
and Thomas v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 378 (5th Cir. 1943).
48 See Bounds v. United States, supra note 21, reV'd on another point in 262 F.
2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Bankston v. United States, supra note 21, and Fried-
lander v. United States, supra note 21.
-1 Supra note 15 at 789.
50 14 T.C.M. 1024 (1955), aff'd. 241 F. 2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957).
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missioner any basis for attacking subsequent cases on a dividend
theory.
Although most of the decided cases in this area have resulted in
victory for the taxpayer, the Commissioner has not been totally with-
out success, although it has been in limited areas. Payments made
under a legal, moral or statutory obligation have been consistently
held to be includible in the income of the widow or like beneficiary. 5
These payments, of course, would, under the 1954 Code, be subject
to the $5,000 exclusion of Sec. 101(b). This rule is applied even
in cases where the amount of the payment is in the discretion of the
payor. 2 The burden of proof to show the absence of an obligation is,
of course, on the taxpayer. 53
Even though no fixed obligation exists, the past practice of the
corporation may give rise to obligations by implication and result in
the taxation of the benefits so received. Such a case is Simpson v.
United States.- There the corporation made payments to widows of
corporate executives four times during the period from 1928 to
1947, pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors adopted in
1910. Prior to the death of the instant taxpayer's husband, the cor-
poration had revised the 1910 resolution to provide for payments to
widows of specific officers and directors, although the resolution stated
that no director should receive any vested rights by reason thereof.
The corporation treated the payments in a special salaries account.
The District Court nonetheless held that a gift was intended, but the
Seventh Circuit reversed on the basis that a plan had been established
prior to the death of taxpayer's husband and that services had been
rendered to the corporation by the deceased under the plan. Thus the
payments were taxable to the widow. In at least partial conflict with
Simpson is the ruling in Allinger v. U.S.5 There two officers, owning
majority interest in a corporation informally, agreed that upon the
death of either of them, the corporation would pay one year's salary
of the deceased to his widow. After the death of one officer, the
corporation resolved to pay the agreed amount "in consideration of
51 "Iegal"-I.T. 3840, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 7; Arthur W. Davis Estate, 11 T.C.M.
814 (1952), and Flarsheim v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.Mo. 1945),
aff'd. 156 F. 2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946).
"inoral"-Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 28, and Simpson v.
United States, 261 F. 2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 944 (1959).
"statutory"-Anna E. Curtis, 8 T.C. 266 (1947) ; I.T. 3972, 1949-2 Cum. Bull.
15; Riley v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 751 (Ct.C1. 1957), and Varnedoe v.
Allen, 67 F. Supp. 152 (N.D.Ga. 1946), aff'd. 158 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946),
cert. den. 330 U.S. 821 (1947) Note that benefits for widows of Servicemen and
Congressmen received pursuant to statute are treated as gifts. Rev. Rul. 55-330,
1955-1 Cum. Bull. 236, and Rev. Rul. 55-609, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 24.
5 Anna E. Curtis, supra note 51.
5 Estate of Charles J. Ginsburg, supra note 35.
54Supra note 51.
55 Supra note 21.
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past services." The Court found the payments to be a gift, despite the
existence of the informal agreement, which was reasoned to be of no
effect since it was merely the act of two officers and was not
binding on the corporation. Allinger can be technically distinguished
from Simpson on the fact that no plan was present by corporate act,
although a complete reading discloses that the basic attitudes of the
two cases are conflicting. There are numerous cases such as Allinger
where the fact that the corporation had previously made like payments
did not in itself create a plan. In each of these cases, payments to the
widow were considered on an individual basis. In all of them the pay-
ments were held to be gifts. 56
It is also relatively clear that payments of compensation which are
earned at the time of the decedent's death, but are not paid to either
his estate or his widow until after death, are income in respect to a
decedent and as such are includible in the recipient's gross income.
5 7
Included in this category are accumulated leave pay,58 profit-sharing
benefits,5 9 earned termination pay, 60 unpaid life insurance renewal
commissions,61 and continued retirement compensation.6 2 However,
the question of whether a normal bonus, normally paid by an employer
after the death of an employee, constitutes income in respect of a
decedent is not entirely clear. In Estate of O'Daniel,6 3 the amount of
the regularly paid corporate bonus which the employee would have
received if he had been living was paid to his estate after his death.
The employee, if living, would have had no enforceable claim to such
bonus and hence his estate certainly had none. The bonus was held
to be income with respect of a decedent and taxable to the estate of
the deceased as recipient. However, in the recent case of Standard
Asbestos Mfg. and Insulating Co.,6 the Tax Court, in a like factual
situation, found that post death payments, made to the widow of the
deceased president of the corporation, were made without obligation
on the part of the corporation and were gifts, not includible in the
gross income of taxpayer.65 Perhaps these two cases can be dis-
tinguished by the fact that in O'Daniel the payment was made to the
estate while in Standard Asbestos it was made directly to the widow.
5 See Estate of Arthur Helistrom, supra note 14; Florence S. Luntz, supra
note 20; Rodner v. United States, supra note 21; Ruth Hahn, supra note 15;
Estate of John Heckman, supra note 20, and Reed v. United States, supra note 21.
5 7nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §691.
58 Rev. Rul. 55-229, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 75.
59 United States v. Ellis, 264 F. 2d 325 (2nd Cir. 1959).
60 Estate of Arthur W. Davis, supra note 51.
61 Latendresse v. Comm., 243 F. 2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S.
830 (1957). But see Florence Carr, supra note 20.
62 Fisher v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 759 (Mass. 1955).
63 Supra note 28.
64 Supra note 20.
65 See also Alice A. MacFarlane, supra note 15, and Elizabeth R. Matthews,
supra note 20.
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However, as previously indicated, the Tax Court has recently ignored
any such distinction.'6 It should be noted that although Standard
Asbestos was taken on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, it was by the tax-
payer on another point with no cross-appeal by the Government on the
bonus issue.6 7 Thus, the current law is that bonus payments made
without obligation on the part of the payor, even though based upon
activities of the deceased during his lifetime, constitute tax-free gifts.
The authorities have, with minor variations,65 consistently followed
the factual test set forth in Hellstrom. 9 These have been previously
noted and will not be repeated. However, a recent case has restated
in a varied form, the factors to be considered in determining the exist-
ence of a voluntary payment to the widow.70 This Court indicates
the following considerations: (1) the existence of a plan or policy in
the past of making similar payments; (2) the adequacy of the past
compensation of the deceased officer or employee; (3) the absence of
a personal relationship or close family ties between the payor and the
recipient; (4) the extent to which personal affection motivated the
payment; and (5) the statements and conduct of the donor. These
factors indicate a more perceptive approach to the problem of truly
determining intent than those noted in Hellstrom. Their strict applica-
tion would have defeated gift status in several of the cases previously
decided in favor of the widow. The writer lists them here by way
of summary of the factual pattern which the taxpayer must satisfy
in future cases of this type.
PAYMENTS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
Until the adoption of Sec. 302 of the Revenue Act of 1951,
there were no statutory provisions directly involving death payments
by employers. The cases excluding voluntary death payments had
based this exclusion solely on the provisions of the Code pertaining
to gifts. Section 302 of the 1951 Act amended Sec. 22(b)(1) of the
1939 Code 1 which related to the taxation of the proceeds of life in-
surance. The amendment provided for a $5,000 exclusion for pay-
ments received pursuant to a contract from an employer, by the bene-
ficiaries of an employee by reason of his death. Five thousand
dollars could be received tax free from each employer of the de-
ceased. The obvious purpose of this legislation was to equalize the
66 Estate of Frank J. Foote, supra note 20.
67 Supra note 20.
68 A special factor of importance to Wisconsin practitioners in this area has
been noted by Judge Tehan in Friedlander v. United States, supra note 21.
There both the corporation and the widow filed the requisite Wisconsin gift
tax forms and the widow paid the required gift tax. This was taken to be
an indication that a gift was intended.
69 Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, supra note 14.
70 Packard v. United States, supra note 19.
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22(b) (1).
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tax treatment of the proceeds of a life insurance contract paid upon
the death of an employee and a payment directly by the employer
under the same circumstances.
The See. 22(b) (1) exclusion was not construed by the Commis-
sioner as having any relation whatsoever to gratuitous payments, as
indicated by the regulations promulgated under it. They provided that
the payments must be pursuant to an enforceable written contract be-
tween the employer and the deceased employee, or an established plan
providing for payments to all employees or special classes of em-
ployees.7 2
Basically the revision of this section in the 1954 Code eliminated
the requirement that the payments must be made under a contract of
the employer, to qualify for the $5,000 exclusion. In addition, the 1954
Code limited each deceased employee to a single $5,000 exclusion and
contained other qualifications on the exclusion which are not relevant
to this discussion. Thus, as presently constituted, Sec. 101 (b) provides
for an exclusion from gross income, not exceeding $5,000, of volun-
tary death benefits paid to the estate or the beneficiaries of a deceased
employee. At first glance it would appear that under this section all
gratuitous payments made to a widow of a deceased employee ex-
ceeding $5,000 would be taxable income to her. A closer look, however,
indicates that this was not the intent of the 1954 revision.
As indicated above, payments made under a legal or moral obliga-
tion, or under a non-contractual plan, do not qualify for gift status.
Under Sec. 22(b) (1) these payments also did not qualify for the
$5,000 exclusion and were fully taxable. Thus, gifts were totally
exempt; payments under a written contract or an established plan
were exempt to the extent of $5,000; and payments between these two
extremes were fully taxable. Congress was faced with this senseless
situation when they considered the 1954 revision. Their solution was
the elimination of the contractual requirement, thus placing non-con-
tractual payments on an equal footing with those made under contract.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates any intention on the part
of Congress to place gratuitous payments under the limitations of
Sec. 101 (b). Rather, the Committee Reports indicate that Congress
intended to liberalize the exclusion rules rather than to restrict them
by bringing under their scope payments which had been judicially de-
termined to be totally exempt from tax. The House Ways and Means
Committee noted that
Present law provides a special exclusion of up to $5,000 for
payments by an employer to beneficiaries of a deceased em-
ployee. Under existing law, however, this exclusion is available
72 Treas. Regs. 118, §39.22(b) (1)-2(c).
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only where the employer is under a contractual obligation to
pay the death benefits ....
Restricting the exemption to benefits paid under a contract
discriminates against those who receive benefits where this con-
tractual obligation does not exist. To avoid this problem your
commmittee's bill extends this exclusion to death benefits
whether or not paid under a contract.73
This hardly sounds like a radical departure from existing judicial
authority 74 which would be present if the $5,000 limitation were meant
to apply to payments in the form of gifts. Certainly any attempt to
include previously tax exempt items within this limitation would have
been specifically expressed.
It should be noted that the Committee report makes reference to
"this exclusion", thereby indicating that not all tax exempt income was
considered. This conclusion is further supported by the final form of
Sec. 101(b) (2) (A) which states that the limitation applies to
amounts excludable under Sec. 101(b). It does not attempt to apply
the limitation to amounts excludable under other provisions of the
Code and no reason appears for such application. Also note the
fact that the general exclusion under Sec. 101(b) applies to
amounts received by the estate or the beneficiaries of an employee.
Clearly the widow is not the estate and hence the Commissioner must
bring her within the meaning of beneficiaries of the employee. This
requires a strained interpretation of that phrase. It must be remem-
bered that these same provisions now apply to payments under con-
tract. Considering this, it appears that the far more logical interpreta-
tion of beneficiary is the person designated by the employee to re-
ceive death benefits under his contractual rights. A further point
worthy of consideration is contained in Sec. 101(f). That subsec-
tion states that Sec. 101 only applies to amounts received by reason
of the death of an employee after the effective date of the 1954 Code.
Until such time, the provisions of Sec. 22(b) (1) of the 1939 Code
are indicated to apply. This is a further, clear indication that Sec.
101 is the successor to Sec. 22(b)(1) and not to Sec. 22(b)(3) under
which the gratuitous payments to widows were excluded. On the basis
of the above comments on the legislative history of Sec. 101 and
that statute itself, it is submitted that Congress had no intent to tie
together Secs. 101 and 102 of the Code and make the $5,000 limita-
tion of Sec. 101 apply to the totally tax exempt gift of Sec. 102.
Intended rather was the elimination of discrimination between pay-
ments under contract and those under non-contractual obligations.
This interpretation has been adopted in the only case on this issue
73 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 14.
74 Both Louise K. Aprill, supra note 13, and Alice M. MacFarlane, supra note
15, were decided prior to 1954 revision deliberations.
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decided under the 1954 Code.1 5 There, confronted with a factual situ-
ation similar to the many cases decided under the 1939 Code, the Court
found that the entire amount of the payments to the widow were a
non-taxable gift. In rejecting the Government's argument that the
limitation of Sec. 101(b) (2) (A) applied, the Court noted in its
conclusions of law:
It is clear that the purpose of the latter section (section
101(b)) of the 1954 Code is to eliminate the requirement that
certain employee death benefits must be paid pursuant to a
contractual obligation in order for such benefits to qualify for
a $5,000 exclusion from gross income.7 6
The Court also directly held that Congress did not intend to change Sec.
102(a) by enacting Sec. 101(b).
Standing against Reed is the dicta contained in two 1939 Code
cases.7 7 In Rodner the Court went so far as to note that its interpreta-
tion of the 1954 Code was in conflict with the Committee Reports, but
stated that Congress was not aware of the law and hence the reports
should be rejected.7 8 With due respect to the Court it is submitted
that it was in error regarding the awareness of the lawmakers. Con-
gress certainly recognized that under prior law all contractual pay-
ments were taxable and subject to the exclusion, but that not all non-
contractual payments were non-taxable. As indicated previously, sev-
eral types of non-contractual payments were subject to tax, but were
not given the benefit of the $5,000 limitation. It was these types of
payments which Congress clearly intended to grant equal treatment
with contractual payments. The dictum in Bounds stands. Without a
statement of the reasoning of the Court, it must be assumed that it
75 Reed v. United States, sapra note 21.
76 Id. at 209.77 Rodner v. United States, supra note 21, and Bounds v. United States, supra
note 21.
78 Rodner v. United States, .mupra note 21 at 237:
"The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (not applicable here) changed
this. Section 101 (b), 68A Stat. 26, quoted in the .margin, eliminates the
provisions limiting to contractual death benefits the application of the$5,000 exemption. To me the effect of this would seem to be to with-
draw the complete exemption that gratuitous death benefits had enjoyed
and to substitute an exemption up to $5,000. In the complete revision
effected by the 1954 Code the general language exempting gifts is con-
trolled by the particular language of section 101 (b) limiting the exemp-
tion of death benefits to $5,000. Gifts in general are exempt but gifts in
the form of death benefits are taxable insofar as they exceed $5,000.
"That does not seem to have been the view of the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance of a subsequent congress, however. In the Report
referred to, p. 14, the Committee deals with this very change and says
'The exclusion is * * * made available regardless of whether the em-
employer has a contractual obligation to pay the death benefits.' That
language is certainly that of some one who thinks that the new pro-
vision extends a boon instead of a burden to the recipients of gratuitous
death benefits. V"ith the utmost respect, I believe that the Committee's
view of the prior law was a misinterpretation."
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was made on the basis of the same superficial glance at the problem as
made in Rodner. Of the three decisions Reed, is clearly the proper
interpretation of the effect of the limitation contained in Sec. 101(b)-
(2) (A). The only provision applicable to gratuitous payments under
the 1954 Code is Sec. 102. The limitation of Sec. 101(b) (2) (A)
does not apply and all amounts so received by the widow are tax
exempt to her.
DEDUCTION ALLOWED TO EMPLOYER
I.T. 3329, in addition to providing tax-free status for the recipient
of voluntary payments to widows of corporate officers or employees,
also indicated that such payments were deductible by the corporation
as a business expense.D This position was in conformity with the then
existing regulations80 and was not altered by the Commissioner's 1950
change of positions l regarding the tax status of such payments in the
hands of the widow. The deductibility of the payments by the corpora-
tion was not affected.82 However, the language of the prior regulations
does not appear in the regulations under the trade or business ex-
penses section of the 1954 Code.8 3 This is due to the Commissioner's
announcement that deductions for payments of this type must now
be under the deferred compensation section of the Code rather than
the business expense section.83 The Commissioner's intention in shift-
ing the deductibility of widow's payments from Sec. 162 to Sec. 404
is not to deny the corporation a deduction, but rather to make the de-
duction available only in the year when the payments are actually
made. Under Sec. 162, an accrual-basis taxpayer could accrue the en-
tire amount of the authorized payments in a single year even though
the payments were, in fact, to be made over a subsequent period of
years. The Commissioner appears warranted in making the shift.
79 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153. "[P]ayments made by a corporation under such circum-
stances not in excess of decedent's salary are properly deductible by the payor
corporation as ordinary and necessary business expenses."
80 Treas. Regs. 101, §23(a)-9.
81 I.T. 4027, 1950-2, Cum. Bull. 9.82 Treas. Regs. 118, §39.23(a)-9. "When the amount of the salary of an officer or
employee is paid for a limited period after his death to his widow or heirs,
in recognition of the services rendered by the individual, such payments may
be deducted."
83 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §162; Treas. Reg. §1.162-10.
84 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §404.
85 Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 85 held that payments of this type were
deductible under Sec. 23(a), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, which is now Sec. 162,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954. However, this was modified by Rev. Rul. 55-212,
1955-1 Cum. Bull. 299 which required that such deductions be claimed under
Sec. 23(p) rather than Sec. 23(a). This former section is now Sec. 404, Int.
Rev. Code of 1954. Regarding this subject Treas. Reg. §lA04(a)-12 provides:
"Similarly, if amounts are paid as a death benefit to the beneficiaries
of an employee (for example, by continuing his salary for a reason-
able period), and if such amounts meet the requirements of Section
162 or 212, such amounts are deductible under Section 404(a) (5) in any
case when they are not deductible under the other paragraphs of
Section 404 (a)."
[Vol. 44
TAX TREATMENT OF WIDOWS
However, the section he is attempting to apply"6 relates to a plan de-
ferring compensation. It is, of course, his theory that voluntary pay-
ments to a widow are additional compensation to the deceased em-
ployee. He further reasons that the payments, after the death of the
employee, were merely deferred pursuant to a plan. But this position
has not been sustained by the only apparent case in which it w a s
raised.8 7 In Champion Spark Plug Co., the board of directors of an
accrual-basis taxpayer resolved to pay voluntarily to a former em-
ployee or his widow, thirty thousand dollars over a period of thirty
months. The Commission conceded that the payments were ordinary
and necessary business expenses, but claimed that they were subject to
Sce. 23(p) of the 1939 Code and were deductible only when actually
paid. The Court found that the payments were not additional com-
pensation made pursuant to any informal plan, but were merely gratuit-
ous8s payments made to provide for a fatally ill, former employee in
a time of financial hardship. It thus concluded that the provisions of
Sec. 23(p) did not apply and the entire amount was deductible at the
time it became an unconditional obligation of the company. A non-
acquiescence has been issued by the Commissioner" and it can be
assumed that he will continue to press his theory that these payments
are to be treated as deferred compensation.
It has long been recognized that post-death payments made pur-
suant to an employment contract are deductible by the corporation,
subject to the normal reasonable compensation rules.9 0 As indicated
previously, regulations allowing this deduction 9' contained the pro-
vision that the payments be for a "limited period." This was defined
by the Tax Court in I. Putnam, Inc.92 to be a period of two years, and
hence, as a general rule, a deduction was allowed for only such period .
3
The appearance of Rev. Rul. 54-62594 noted the Commissioner's aban-
donment of the "limited period" concept and the substitution therefor
of a test of "reasonableness." The ruling allowed payment of one
year's salary over a period of twelve years on the theory that the total
amount to be paid was reasonable. Despite this change in emphasis,
it is submitted that payments limited in amount to two years' salary
86 Sec. 404(a) (5).
87 Champion Spark Plug Co., 30 T.C. (1958), aff'd. 266 F. 2d 347 (6th Cir.
1959).
88 The question of whether or not the payments were income to the recipient
was not present.
89 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
90 See Seavey &. Flarsheim Brokerage Co., 41 BTA 198 (1940).
91 Treas Reg. 118, §39.23 (a)-9.
92 15 T.C. 86 (1950), acq. 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 4.
93 See McLaughlin Gromley King Co., 11 T.C. 569 (1948); William H. Swan
and Sons, Inc.. 14 T.C.M. 105 (1955), and Bleichroeder, Bing & Co., Inc., 12
T.C.M. 117 (1953).
94 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 85.
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would be allowable as reasonable. 95 It should be noted that by adopting
the reasonableness test for payments to widows, the Commissioner is
again attempting to equate such payments to the compensation paid
to living employees where this test has always been applied.
At least some indication of the Tax Court's current attitude to-
ward the issue of deductibility is shown by Fifth Avenue Coach
Lines, Inc.9" There the widow of the deceased corporate president
received payments for a period of five years, equal in amount to the
deceased's salary for thirty-one months. The Court found the pay-
ments to be in part as additional compensation to the deceased, in
part as gratitude for past services and in part as an aid to the widow.
It then noted that "to be deductible the payments need not be in the
nature of additional compensation," 97 but need only be reasonable in
amount and concluded that the payments for the five years in dispute
were ordinary and necessary business expense. Thus in effect the
Court found a partial gift and nonetheless allowed the deduction. The
Commissioner has acquiesced in that portion of the decision which
allows the deduction for payments for past services, but he has appar-
ently refused to acquiesce in that portion allowing the deduction of
payments not for such services.98
Normally the questions of whether a payment is deductible to the
payor and includible in the income of the recipient are not present
before the Court at the same time. In addition, in many of the cases
where the widow was involved, the Commissioner had allowed the de-
duction to the corporation without contest. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines,
Inc.9 9 goes as far as any case authority in sustaining the deduction and
excluding the payments from income. Apparently the Tax Court actu-
ally sees no inconsistency in such treatment, 00 although it had at least
noted this position in an earlier case. 1 ' However, it is extremely un-
likely that the commissioner will allow this question to be settled with-
out a stronger fight. In view of his consistent losses in attempting to
95 Note W. D. Haden Co., 5 T.C.M. 250 (1946) where a deduction was totally
disallowed because the resolution authorizing payments did not limit their
duration.9031 T.C. 1080 (1959).
9 Id. at 1096.
98 See 1959-36 Cum. Bull. 7.
99 Supra note 96.
20 In the argument in the United States Supreme Court in Duberstein v.
Commissioner, supra note 4, the Government contended that the concept of a
gift was inconsistent with a payment's being deducted as a business expense.
In commenting on this the Court noted that this factor as well as others were:
"evidentiary inferences relevant to a factual determination on the totality of
circumstances in the case: it is doubtless relevant to the over-all inference
that the transferor treats a payment as a business deduction .... Thus the
Court recognized that treatment of the payments as deductible expenses had
a bearing on the intent of the payor but that it was not controlling. The
Court refused to accept the Government's contention that deductibility and
gift status were totally inconsistent.
101 See Estate of Albert W. Morse, supra note 20.
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tax the payments in the hands of the widow, he may now place greater
attention on the deduction by the corporation. Despite the Commis-
sioner's reluctance to agree with the Fifth Avenue Coach Lines doc-
trine, it is submitted that this case is correctly decided and that a de-
duction of a truly gratuitous payment is proper if limited to a reason-
able amount.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion, the writer believes that it is proper to
conclude that the controversy over the tax status of voluntary pay-
ments to widows of corporate officers or employees, both as to the
employer and the widow, has not ended. However, it is submitted that
the controversy in the future should be limited to the application of
a particular set of facts to well established rules of law. Assuming that
the Reed case properly expresses the law as to the effecf of Sec.
101(b) (2) (A), and this writer believes that it does, it can be seen
that the factual tests established under Aprill and the succeeding cases
will still control. Gratuitous payments will continue to be totally non-
taxable to the widow if the standard facts are present. If the factual
tests are not met, the payments will not be given gift status, but they
may nonetheless qualify for the $5,000 exclusion of Sec. 101(b). In
addition, it is submitted that the gratuitous payment constitutes a de-
duction to the employer if the payments are limited to a reasonable
amount. However, in this area, corporate taxpayers can anticipate in-
creasing resistance from the Commissioner.
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